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ercy."

Carter's UFOs

Jimmy Carter's favorite movie lately is *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*. As a matter of fact, the President has seen the movie several times.

This news has given renewed encouragement to UFO buffs who were discouraged by the government's January decision to drop plans for new investigations of the UFO phenomenon.

Last July the White House requested the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to take another look at the UFO sightings. NASA later reported, however, that there was nothing new to warrant further investigation and the matter was dropped.

Under the circumstances NASA's decision was a prudent one. There had, after all, been no discoveries of the "hard" evidence strict scientific investigation requires — something left behind by the alien visitors. A lunch wrapper. A sign. Something.

But then Jimmy Carter discovered *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*. Hope has returned. Should Carter be helicoptering to Devil's Tower, Wyoming, sometime soon, NASA won't need a lunch wrapper clue.

Phx Gazette, March 18, 78

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have violated, I feel, at this time, and we intend to carry out. Obviously I can't do everything that I want to. Nobody could. But I am determined to do my best.

MR. DeFRANK: Is there anything about being President which has surprised you so far or proven particularly frustrating? Some of your closest friends and advisers worry that you concern yourself with too much detail and that to some extent you take your "in-basket" too seriously. Would you agree?

THE PRESIDENT: That has always been my nature. I couldn't do it otherwise. The last week, for instance, I spent an extraordinary time working on the energy question, the two messages, and trying to make the final decision, and in the process my in-basket built up. By midnight last night my in-basket was empty. Ordinarily I don't get more than four or five hours behind on my incoming responsibilities.

I have made one decision quite early that saved me from myself, and that is to appoint Cabinet officers who can manage their own departments without my interference.

I have never felt constrained to look behind any of the Cabinet Secretaries to check on their performance of duty, and I have never felt restrained to ask any of my White House staff members to do that; that they are strong and able and competent and independent. And in order to make sure that I know what goes on under those circumstances, we have initiated a weekly Cabinet meeting where we spend two, sometimes three hours together going over those matters.

I have been pleasantly surprised at the President's job. I had been a Governor. There are a lot of parallels. Obviously, there are two things that are not parallel, is the defense matters and foreign affairs. (Inaudible) nuclear decisions, both in power production, reprocessing, non-proliferation and weapons. But I have been pleasantly surprised at the harmony that now exists within my own staff here in the White House, between the staff and the Cabinet officers and among the Cabinet officers themselves.

I have found it difficult to accept the complete absence of confidentiality. I have just come to expect that when I have a conversation about a sensitive matter in private, that it is going to be made public very quickly.

And I had to be a little more cautious about my oppression of opinion on a tentative basis or when it affects some personal, potentially personal embarrassing subject.

That has been an opinion that I haven't been able to accommodate yet.

MR. DeFRANK: That must be the reason why Hamilton never tells us who wins.

THE PRESIDENT: I could say this: We are pretty evenly matched.

MR. DeFRANK: That is not what he says. He says you are not evenly matched and you kill him.

MS. CLIFT: Some people in and out of government feel that you might be trying to do too much too fast. And the energy package, for example, one of your own aids said it could have used 30 days of staff work. Is that a fair criticism?

THE PRESIDENT: Not in the case of energy. I think in some other areas we have tried to move too fast, but there is a built-in delay mechanism that exists in the Federal Government that saves you from moving too fast.

You might try to move too fast, so I don't think that you often do. To the extent that we don't do our staff work, when our proposals get to Congress they get bogged down in committees unnecessarily.

I believe that had I had another 30 days on the energy package there would not have been any substantial difference on what we proposed.

The one item on which we changed our mind in a major degree was the \$50 rebate. At the time we made the decision (inaudible) everything about the economy was dismal, growth was down, employment was up, inflation was less than it is now. That has recovered so well so that I think even the latest data that came out since we made that decision is confirmed that we just don't need it.

Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Agency	Address	Phone	Website
Defense Finance and Accounting Service	1115 North Crystal Drive, Suite 2000, Arlington, VA 22204-4302	703-605-7000	www.dfas.mil

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is a federal government agency that provides financial and accounting services to the Department of Defense. It is a major component of the Department's financial management system.

Defense Finance and Accounting Service

1115 North Crystal Drive, Suite 2000
Arlington, VA 22204-4302

Director: Thomas R. Blum
Deputy Director: (NACDAG)

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service was established by Executive Order on November 15, 1949, and reports to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The Defense Finance and Accounting Service is the primary provider of financial and accounting services to the Department of Defense. The Service is responsible for the consolidation, harmonization, approval, and integration of financial and accounting requirements, functions, processes, operations, and systems in the Department.

For more information, contact the Public Affair Office, Defense Information Systems Agency, 70 South Capitol Mall, Arlington, VA 22204-2799. Phone: 703-605-6900.

Defense Information Systems Agency

70 South Capitol Mall, Arlington, VA 22204-2799
Phone: 703-605-6900

Director: Lt. Gen. David D. Hester, USA
Deputy Director: Maj. Gen. John H. Lawrence, USAF
Chief of Staff: Col. J. Howard Westerman, USA

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a central support agency committed to the provision of timely, objective, and credible military intelligence to the warfighter—officer, sailor, airman, and warrior—and to the decisionmaker

Community, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.

The Agency is organized into a headquarters and field activities acting in the Director's assigned areas of responsibility. The field organizations include the White House Communications Agency, Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization, DSO, Western Hemisphere, Joint Interoperability Test Command, Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization, Defense Technical Information Center, and the Joint Spectrum Center.

The Agency is responsible for planning, developing, and supporting command, control, communications, and information systems that serve the needs of the National Command Authorities under all conditions of peace and war. It manages the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and is responsible for

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For more information, contact the Public Affair Office, Defense Information Systems Agency, 70 South Capitol Mall, Arlington, VA 22204-2799. Phone: 703-605-6900.

Defense Intelligence Agency

The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20340-7407
Phone: 703-695-6071; Website: <http://www.dia.mil>

Director: Lt. Gen. Patrick W. Hughes, USA
Deputy Director: Brian C. Clark
Chief of Staff: Barbara A. Ditzworth

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established by JOSS Directive 310521, effective October 1, 1949, under provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 USC, 401 et seq.). DIA is under the authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.

The Defense Intelligence Agency is a central support agency committed to the provision of timely, objective, and credible military intelligence to the warfighter—officer, sailor, airman, and warrior—and to the decisionmaker

and policymakers of DOD and the Federal Government. To accomplish its assigned mission, DIA produces military intelligence for national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence products; coordinates all DOD intelligence collection requirements; operates the Central Assessment and Signature Intelligence (MASSINT) Organization; manages the Defense Human Intelligence (PLAWINT) Service and the Defense Attaché System; operates the Joint Military Intelligence College; and provides foreign intelligence and counterintelligence

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Defense Threat Reduction Agency

45045 Aviation Drive, Dulles, VA 20166-7517
Phone, 703-325-2102. Internet, <http://www.dtra.mil/>.

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Deputy Director

JAY C. DAVIS
MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. MOORE,
USAF

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was established as a separate agency of the Department of Defense on October 1, 1998, by DOD Directive 5105.62. DTRA was formed by the consolidation of selected elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the Defense Technology Security Administration. DTRA is a combat support agency of the Department of Defense and is under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology. DTRA is responsible for threat reduction to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), and other special weapons, as well as advanced conventional weapons. Through the execution of technology security activities, cooperative threat reduction programs, arms control treaty monitoring and on-site inspection, force protection, NBC defense, and counterproliferation, DTRA supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent and provides technical support on weapons of mass destruction matters to DOD components.

For further information, contact the Office of Public Affairs, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 45045 Aviation Drive, Dulles, VA 20166-7517. Phone, 703-810-4326. Internet, <http://www.dtra.mil/>.

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

4600 Sangamore Road, Bethesda, MD 20816-5003
Phone, 301-227-7400. Internet, <http://www.nima.mil/>.

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The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was established on October 1, 1996, as a member of the intelligence community and a Department of Defense combat support agency. It is chartered under DOD Directive 5105.60, pursuant to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (10 U.S.C. 441 *et seq.*). NIMA operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of

Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in accordance with the policies and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence exercises overall supervision over NIMA.

The Agency is responsible for providing timely, relevant, and accurate

imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information in support of the national security objectives of the United States. With a vision of guaranteeing the information edge, NIMA is committed to delivering the imagery and geospatial information that gives national policymakers and military users information superiority in a rapidly changing global environment.

NIMA supports national policy objectives by committing substantial imagery analysis resources to national priorities, especially as they relate to diplomatic and regional security policy, arms control and treaty monitoring activities, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, chemical and biological warfare, and information operations activities.

NIMA also provides geospatial information, such as natural and cultural feature data, elevation data, controlled imagery, international boundaries, and place names necessary to understanding the context of intelligence information. This information supports a full range of

diplomatic, disaster relief, countermobility, no-fly zone enforcement, force protection, and humanitarian and multi-national peacekeeping activities.

NIMA also provides accurate and current geospatial information required by the unified combatant commands to plan, operate, and if necessary, fight and win. NIMA's strategy supports operational readiness through a concentrated investment in geospatial foundation data, including controlled imagery, digital elevation data, and selected feature information, which can be rapidly augmented and fused with other spatially referenced information, such as intelligence, weather, and logistics data. The result is an integrated digital view of the mission space that is crucial for diplomatic, military, and civil relief operations.

NIMA is headquartered in Bethesda, MD, and operates major facilities in Washington, DC, Reston, VA, and St. Louis, MO.

For further information, contact the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 4600 Sangamore Road, Bethesda, MD 20816-5003. Phone, 800-826-0342, or 301-227-7386. Fax, 301-227-7638. Internet, <http://www.nima.mil/>.

National Security Agency/Central Security Service

Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
Phone, 301-688-6524. Internet, <http://www.nsa.gov/>.

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The National Security Agency was established by Presidential directive in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense. In this directive, the President designated the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the signals intelligence and communications security activities of the Government. In 1972, the Central Security Service was established, also in accordance with a Presidential

memorandum, to provide a more unified cryptologic organization within the Department of Defense, with control over the signals intelligence activities of the military services. In 1986, NSA was designated a combat support agency of DOD.

As the U.S. cryptologic organization, NSA/CSS employs the Nation's premier codemakers and codebreakers. It ensures an informed, alert, and secure



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
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signed to enable us to launch a response between the time we detect an incoming attack and the time it actually impacts. The flight time of a ballistic missile from Russia to the United States is twenty-five to thirty minutes. Within two to seven minutes of launch we should have detected and identified any massive attack. There are elaborate procedures for cross-checking and evaluating the evidence while gathering senior military commanders and civilian officials on a conference telephone call. That could mean rousing people out of a sound sleep, interrupting meetings, locating those who are playing golf or shopping, and so on. There would be duty officers continuously in the command centers of the major military commands, the Pentagon, and the White House, but the probability of getting most of the principal officials on whom the president relies (e.g., the secretary of defense) on the phone within five to ten minutes is not high. Once these officials assembled, they would need some time to ask their own questions and to make their own evaluations before deciding to bring in the president. Scrambling a president summarily is not something that can be done cavalierly, especially if the commander in chief is engaged in some very public activity.

Thus, the president would be facing a very short deadline once brought into the debate. At least ten minutes, and more likely fifteen, would be needed to transmit an order to launch our weapons, to verify it, and to give the missiles and bombers time enough to launch and fly far enough away to avoid the effects of the incoming attack. That means there could be as little as three minutes, and at the very most eighteen, to assemble principals and for the president to make the most momentous decision in history (see Figure 1.1). It is irresponsible even to pretend we have the capability for making a decision of this import under these conditions—or that we would do so even if we could.

However, maintaining the pretense of being able to launch on warning has been an additional way of dissuading the Soviets, and now the Russians, from attempting a surprise attack. Yet that benefit must be weighed against the risk of keeping a large part of our nuclear force on constant hair-trigger alert. We have had thousands of false alarms of impending missile attacks on the United States, and a few could have spun out of control. One such incident took place on June 3, 1980. Zbigniew "Zbig" Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's assistant for national security affairs, was awakened at 2:26 A.M. by a phone call from Colonel William Odom, a

FIGURE 1.1 Best and Worst Cases for Firing Our ICBMs Under Attack from Russia



staff officer responsible for matters of nuclear readiness. Odom told him the warning system was predicting a nuclear attack of 220 missiles on the United States with the specific destination unknown. The alarm bells of nuclear alert were ringing, and the conference calls were under way. Shortly thereafter, Odom called back to say the warning indicators had changed to an all-out attack of 2,220 missiles. Bomber crews on alert were manning their aircraft and the Pacific Command's airborne command post had taken off. What flashed through Brzezinski's mind was that in less than thirty minutes it would be all over for him and most other Washingtonians. He was determined to ensure that the Soviet Union would be equally devastated but decided he had another minute before having to wake President Carter and confront him with a decision on whether to launch a counterattack immediately. Brzezinski asked Odom to give him one more update. Odom called again almost immediately to say that only one of our warning stations had reported the impending attack. The fact that no other station saw it indicated there was a computer error in the system. The crisis came and went in a matter of minutes.'

Still, the chances of our going to war on the basis of a false alarm have always been low. A president would see that releasing any number of nu-

SALT II

ance that would count but how much of our lethal potential would still be available after a surprise, preemptive attack by the Soviets. Would there be enough retaliatory potential to pose a devastating threat? If so, that should deter the Soviets from attempting one. We looked at the worst possible case—assuming they would launch the most disabling attack they could and that we would simply ride it out. We then assessed the number of hard targets and the size of the urban area in the Soviet Union that our surviving nuclear forces would still be able to destroy. The result was revealing and meaningful: No matter what the Soviets did, and despite their being ahead of us quantitatively, the United States could still level the entire urban area of the Soviet Union between one and two times. Put simply, in the worst case imaginable we had much more than enough invulnerable retaliatory force to destroy the Soviet Union as a society. I was encouraged, because I could now tell Downey and his colleagues something relevant to the decisions they had to make.

Alas, the conclusion was all too meaningful for the Pentagon. It sent a clear message that the United States possessed more than enough nuclear weaponry. Yet at that very moment our military was proposing to build still another ICBM, the MX. The rationale was that our existing mix of forces was too vulnerable to surprise attack, something our analysis clearly disputed. The Pentagon's argument against us at CIA, that we in the intelligence field were doing war-gaming and that was not our province, was a sterile bureaucratic ploy.

As we debated this into 1980, I found myself increasingly isolated. Even the CIA's analysts were not behind me. They were concerned not to get the CIA involved in the debate over the MX. There is a strong ethic among intelligence professionals that they must not take sides on policy issues, lest they be accused of slanting the intelligence to support their views. Intelligence analyses, however, must be relevant to policymaking. This one was, and it laid out the facts without taking sides.

In December 1980, despite the objections of the secretary of defense, I sent this analysis to President Carter. It was customary to permit those who dissented with an intelligence report to include their contrary views in it. In this instance, the military intelligence organizations dissented, as did, with my permission, my own staff at CIA. It revealed to me how deeply embedded the view was that more is better. The CIA's analysts, having spent years carefully measuring whether we matched the Soviets in

every category of nuclear capability, simply could not countenance being the ones to reveal that we did not need to be equal in order to deter.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT ONLY MUCH MORE POWERFUL than conventional ones but are also qualitatively different (see Table 2.1). It is not too far-fetched to think of them as small pieces of sun brought to earth, creating effects otherwise not experienced. That nuclear weapons are a species unto themselves is best shown by the terminology we employ to describe their power. The pound is the unit of measure for the explosive in conventional munitions. In contrast, for nuclear munitions the unit of measure is the metric tonne (2,200 pounds), but the weapons are so powerful that we refer to their force in kilotons (KT—thousands of tonnes) and even megatons (MT—millions of tonnes). Five hundred pounds of TNT is the explosive force of a common conventional bomb; in contrast, a typical warhead in Russia's strategic arsenal carries 550 KT of force. A 550-KT weapon is the equivalent of 550 \times 1,000 (kilo) \times 2,200 (lbs./metric tonne), that is, 1,210,000,000 pounds of conventional explosive. A freight train 150 miles long would be needed to transport that much conventional explosive to an airfield. It would take more than 25,000 sorties by our most modern bomber, the B-2, to deliver it. In the course of some 44,000 aircraft sorties during the six-week air campaign in the Gulf War in 1991, we dropped only 84,000 metric tonnes of conventional bombs, or less than one-fifth of the explosive force of a single 550-KT nuclear bomb.²

It is understandable that we prefer to use MT and KT instead of ten-figure numerals when referring to the force of nuclear weapons; the acronyms are much handier. Doing so, however, has encouraged us to talk rather cavalierly about the magnitude of the power involved. For instance, it is not so incongruous to talk about a "small" nuclear warhead when we label it as .1 KT. A warhead of that lethality is small enough to fit in an artillery shell but is the equivalent of .1 \times 1,000 (kilo) \times 2,200 (lbs./tonne), or 220,000 pounds of conventional explosive. That means that every time a nuclear artillery shell is fired it is the same as launching five fully loaded B-2 bombers at the target.

We must, however, be careful. Equating 550 KT of nuclear explosive with 1.2 billion pounds of conventional explosive, or .1 KT of nuclear

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the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or even from Zbig Brzezinski, who favored the MX. They simply shifted the discussion to whether the president should select a large- or moderate-size version of the missile. My opinion was that the smaller MX was decidedly preferable because we would have the option of making it modestly mobile, and hence less vulnerable, by mounting it on a truck trailer, a railroad car, or an aircraft. What our military clearly wanted was the most powerful counterweight to the even larger ICBMs on the Soviet side. The unspoken argument favoring the larger missile, however, was that nothing less would placate those senators who were wavering on whether to ratify SALT II. It was going to be nip and tuck to garner the sixty-seven votes necessary for approval. The president had to hook some of the senators who were in doubt, and the MX was the bait.

As the meeting drew to a close, President Carter said, in effect, "As I understand the discussion, everyone agrees we should proceed with the MX and in the larger version." I raised my hand: "Mr. President, it is not my role to comment on policy issues, but your use of 'everyone' included me. I do not agree." Not unexpectedly, this had no effect.

CHANGING THE UNDERLYING PREMISES of our nuclear policies as fundamentally as I have suggested would require dedicated leadership by the U.S. president and Congress alike. We have aspired in the past to similarly dramatic changes but have always failed. In 1946 we submitted the Acheson-Lilienthal/Baruch plan to the United Nations for international control over nuclear technology, either for weapons or energy, the end objective being to dispense with nuclear weapons entirely. The Soviet Union thought this was a guise for perpetuating U.S. nuclear hegemony, and the plan was killed almost the moment it was submitted. In 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, working without advisers, almost agreed to eliminate either all ballistic missiles (the U.S. proposal) or all strategic nuclear weapons (the Soviet proposal) within ten years. This startling breakthrough foundered on differences over strategic defenses.

The question today is whether these precedents suggest we should proceed cautiously toward similarly revolutionary changes or, with the end of the Cold War, whether we should hold out for even greater change. In my

view, the forces of resistance are sufficiently in retreat that a firm commitment from a president could move us forward aggressively. Moreover, to proceed piecemeal would only play into the hands of those who will seek to slow the process at every stage.

Surprisingly, however, presidents have not played decisive roles in deciding numbers of nuclear weapons or plans for targeting them, although they certainly knew that the numbers in our arsenal and the amount of damage designed into our war plans were excessive. We can surmise a number of reasons for their reluctance to grapple directly with these wasteful and risky practices. One is that mastering nuclear terminology and technology is time consuming. It also requires perseverance, because military officers are always reluctant to involve civilians in war plans—conventional or nuclear—lest the civilians tinker without possessing adequate expertise. That feeling has been especially strong with nuclear plans because they have been considered so essential to the nation's security.

Early in the nuclear era, this aversion to outside interference bordered on insubordination. General Curtis LeMay, commander of the Strategic Air Command from 1948 to 1957, felt so strongly that only he and his experts could formulate our nuclear strategic plans that for several years he failed to inform even the Joint Chiefs of Staff of changes he had made to those plans.¹ LeMay was an extremist, but his reluctance to share information on nuclear war plans persisted. Beginning with Robert McNamara in 1961, secretaries of defense intruded more and more into this military province, but presidential involvement still was limited. For instance, until the early 1970s the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not brief any president on their annual nuclear war game, which estimated the outcome of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, and then did so largely because they believed the results would justify requests for more nuclear weapons.² During the late 1970s, President Carter made a diligent, personal effort to understand our nuclear position. By 1989 the balance had tipped sufficiently that President George Bush, through Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, put his hand directly on the targeting situation, eliminating thousands of unnecessary targets. And in 1991 President Bush unilaterally withdrew almost all tactical nuclear weapons from deployed positions.

One reason this process took so long is that it has been neither necessary nor advantageous for a president to stir up the issue of reducing numbers of nuclear weapons. It was not necessary because all had confi-

all bets were off. Since I could not imagine the United States starting a nuclear war with Russia, it looked like the legal point was an academic excuse to help justify larger forces. It also fit General LeMay's thesis that we might go first.

I left feeling that despite all the changes that had taken place since Curtis LeMay left SAC in 1957, his influence on StratCom was much stronger than was Lee Butler's.

SECRECY IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IS ANATHEMA. This applies to the necessary secrecy of intelligence operations, to military war plans and equipment, to illegal or improper activities of the government itself—and to nuclear strategy. **Nowhere in our government has secrecy been more profound than with respect to nuclear weapons.** The great emphasis on secrecy concerning the Manhattan Project back in 1942 was easy to understand. After all, we saw ourselves in a fight with Germany on which the fate of the free world hinged. This carried over into the Cold War. **Information about nuclear weapons was one of the first to be sequestered in a special compartment above "Top Secret" labeled "Restricted Data."** Access can still be had only with a special permit. A similarly restrictive approach was applied to our programs for biological and chemical weapons when they were active. It carries over to today for much data on those programs.

A partial result of all of this compartmentation of information is that **presidents and the Congress have played a less active role in formulating policies on weapons of mass destruction than on any other policy of comparable import and expense.** Even within the military, access to information on these weapons has been severely restricted. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder citizens have not been well informed. Indeed, they have been misinformed. Many civilian and military experts who shaped policy on nuclear weapons simply lost focus in concocting sophisticated theories that never made sense when first formulated, for example, the necessity of a TRIAD of nuclear forces and plans to escalate nuclear war until we dominated—no matter what the damage to our country. If ever scrutiny by the public was needed because scrutiny by the bureaucracy was so limited, this was it.

Today, adequate citizen input to policies concerning weapons of mass destruction is still lacking. It will take greater openness on the govern-

ment's part to generate it. **The excuse against public involvement continues to be secrecy.** There are, though, only two sectors where secrecy on weapons of mass destruction remains necessary. One is our capabilities and intentions for retaliating to attacks with weapons of mass destruction. The other is advanced techniques for making such weapons. The basic equations are readily available, but we do not want other data that would simplify the task to reach the hands of would-be proliferators. Iraq, for instance, has been forced to follow some cumbersome processes for refining fissionable material in searching for a nuclear capability. Within these limits, we need to devise ways to involve our citizens more. One approach would be for the government to publish more information to help the public grasp the essential elements of weapons of mass destruction. For example:

- A guide to the lethality of these weapons could be produced in the language of nonexperts. This would require the government to acknowledge why and how it has historically underestimated the effects of nuclear weapons. Much the same would apply to explaining the wide variations, even within the government, in estimates of the effects of chemical and biological weapons.
- Data could be released on the problems others face in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction and the state of progress of various aspirant countries. There would be objections that releasing such data showing just how much we know about other countries could compromise our intelligence sources. This need not be the case, however. There are ways to conceal the origin of the data, even by deliberately distorting it by modest amounts.
- Information on the past, present, and future costs of U.S. programs for weapons of mass destruction. This would enable the public to place these programs in perspective with other national needs. This should include the costs of repairing damage to the environment.
- Perhaps most important of all, statistics could be released on the risks we have taken and are taking, especially data as to the number of deaths and the amount of destruction we estimated would be caused by our nuclear war plans at various points in the past. The public needs to understand the extremes to which we

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EXECUTIVE

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1977

To Dr. Carl Sagan

I greatly appreciate the time you took from your busy schedule yesterday to spend two hours with me discussing so many interesting aspects of astronomy.

It was a welcome diversion from earthly concerns, as well as most fascinating and instructive in its own right, to hear from you about such subjects as the planets and stars, black holes, exobiology, and the probabilities of extraterrestrial life.

Many thanks and best wishes to you and your family for the holiday season.

Sincerely,



Dr. Carl Sagan
X Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14850

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CENTRAL FILES

70 re. meeting on astronomy

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June 12, 1979

To Dr. Carl Sagan

I was pleased to be able to meet with you on the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement, and appreciated this opportunity to discuss the issues involved.

As the national debate on the new SALT agreement begins, I would be interested in your personal views on the agreement and its presentation to the Senate and the American people. Having your opinion on these matters will be helpful to me.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

Dr. Carl Sagan
Cornell University
302 Space Sciences Building
Ithaca, New York 14853

June 18, 1979

Dear Dr. Sagan:

As you know, the President and President Brezhnev have signed today in Vienna a new strategic arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of the critical importance of this undertaking, the President wanted you to see and review the relevant documents at the earliest opportunity.

I am enclosing courtesy copies of the Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty (with their associated Agreed Statements and Common Understandings); the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms; a Memorandum Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms (together with a Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the date of signature of the Treaty); and the Statements on Backfire.

The President will transmit the official texts of these documents to the Senate upon his return from Vienna. I hope that you will give these documents your most careful consideration.

Sincerely,

Frank Press
Science and Technology Adviser

Dr. Carl Sagan
Department of Astronauts
and Space Sciences
Space Sciences Building
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853

Enclosures



NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

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OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

JAN 17 1972

Mr. Robert E. Leonard
147 Bridgton Road
Westbrook, ME 04092

Dear Mr. Leonard:

I am absolutely thrilled for you and your family. By accepting Christ as your Savior, you have taken the most important step of your lives, one that will lead all of you to greater happiness in this world and ultimate in the next.

At your request, I will be delighted to give you my personal testimony. Let me emphasize that I view religious beliefs as very much a personal matter and am not suggesting that mine be adopted in part or in total by anyone else.

A Scientist Meets His Maker: The road to a strong faith in God and Jesus Christ, His Son, is arduous to say the least. In my early teens, I suffered from a case of supreme arrogance in which I even questioned in my mind the existence of God. I think all of us go through this phase at one time or another. My movement from a position of indecisiveness to commitment was a factor of two kinds of experience: one with science and one with man.

In my education, as I became exposed to the law and order of the universe, I was literally humbled by the unerring perfection of its mechanisms; I became convinced that there must be divine intent behind it all. It is one thing to accept natural order as a way of life, but as I asked the question, "Why?", then God entered in all His glory. Science and religion ceased to be antagonists. On the contrary, they became sisters. It was revealed to me that while science tries to learn more about the Creation, religion seeks a better understanding of the Creator.

MAY 1 1978

While through science man tries to harness the forces of nature around him, through religion he seeks to control the forces of nature within him.

Today, in our modern world, many young people in particular feel that our rapid advance in the field of science renders such things as religious beliefs untimely or old-fashioned. They wonder why we should be satisfied in "believing" something when science tells us we "know" so many things. It was this way for me. The simple answer to this contention appeared to me as I began to gather scientific knowledge: "knowing" introduces more "questions" in an almost geometric proportion. For example, our venture into space has, in actuality, been only the smallest of first steps and has certainly presented us with more mysteries than it has solved. There is no scientific reason why God cannot retain the same position in our modern world that He held before our inquiry into the nature of just about everything.

Atheists the world over call upon science as their crown witness against the existence of God. But as they try to render proof through scientific reasoning that there is no God, the simple and enlightening truth is that their arguments boomerang, for one of the most fundamental laws of natural science is that nothing in the physical world ever happens without a cause. There simply cannot be a creation without some kind of spiritual creator.

Yes, I would have to say that for me the grandeur of the cosmos confirms my belief in the certainty of a Creator. There are the gift of love, the will of a species to live and propagate, the powerful force at work on a galactic scale, and the growth of an ungainly seed into a beautiful flower. Finite man cannot begin to comprehend an omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, and infinite God. In the final analysis, any effort to reduce God to comprehensible proportions beggars His greatness. The universe, as revealed through scientific inquiry, is the living witness that God has indeed been at work. Understanding the nature of the creation provides a substantive basis for the faith by which we attempt to know the nature of the Creator. My experience with science, then, led me to God--it was as if I were putting a face on God.

My experience with man led me in the same direction. One aspect about human behavior that cannot be understood without believing in

Divine Intent is "conscience." An animal's actions are solely controlled by its basic instincts and urges, such as hunger, fear, love, and need for shelter. The response to these drives by the animal is entirely automatic. In an animal's makeup there is no room for freedom of the will, for searching curiosity, for freedom of doubt and conflict between urges and ethical standards. Only man has been burdened with the conflicts arising out of being an image of God cast into the form of an animal. And only man has been bestowed with a soul which enables him to cope with the eternal.

Conscience is like carrying with you at all times a needle like the localizing needle in an airplane that guides you to a landing. An animal does not know that mysterious little needle that tells you unequivocally what is right and what is wrong. Sometimes you may not like to hear what it tells you; but in most cases you really know what is right even if you choose not to act accordingly. Animals know no scruples as for example, lions naturally hunt and kill gazelles, and gazelles naturally fear lions. For man this little needle, conscience, makes all the difference, because in all other respects man is still an animal and has all the instincts of animals. My realization that man experiences an entirely different dimension as a consequence of being given the gift of conscious reasoning brought me to a strong faith in God.

Now, as a basis and foundation for my faith in God acquired through my experience with science and man, I find Christianity the most rewarding and comforting. I think it is all too easy to overlook the unique beauty of the Christian religion. It is simply that the idea of God creating an extension of Himself as a man and letting this God-man, Jesus Christ, die in an agony, with which each of us can identify, is the ultimate of any sacrifice that God could make to show His love for mankind.

In our search to know God, I have come to believe that the life of Jesus Christ should be the focus of our efforts and inspiration. The reality of this life and His resurrection is the hope of mankind. The basic teachings of Jesus are unambiguous, consistent, and unforgettable, as anyone who has ever read the Sermon on the Mount will testify.

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
Jesus greatly expanded mankind's basic moral laws. His commandment, to "love thy neighbor as thyself," established the unselfish attitude that enables human beings to live peaceably together. Even more revolutionary, was His commandment to "love thy enemies." Although it is all too rarely followed, it has left an indelible and unforgettable imprint on the man-to-man relationships among people everywhere on our globe. When man was given the opportunity to know Jesus Christ almost 2,000 years ago, the world was turned upside down through the widespread witness of His followers. The same thing can happen again today.

As a Christian, it seems to me that one of the most important eternal truths that Christ left with us is that if we seek it earnestly enough, there can be a very direct personal relationship between God and man. I am not in despair about the discordant conditions of our social environment. In spite of all the temporary setbacks that humanity has suffered through the centuries, I strongly believe that God, through our personal relationships with Himself and Jesus Christ, will see to it that man's path will continue upward leading toward gradual improvement. In this relationship, I accept God, through faith, as an intelligent will, perfect in goodness, revealing Himself through His creation--the world in which we live.


In conclusion, let me say that I think it is grand that you speak out for Jesus in the jails of Portland. If you use my testimony, please remember that I do not hold it out as a blueprint for the correct path to Jesus for anyone else.

I pray that your efforts among the inmates will reap many rewards and that you and your family will enjoy health and prosperity.

Sincerely,



Werner von Braun
Deputy Associate Administrator



4-104. Classified information no longer needed in current working files or for reference or record purposes shall be processed for appropriate disposition in accordance with the provisions of Chapters 21 and 33 of Title 44 of the United States Code, which governs disposition of Federal records.

4-105. Classified information disseminated outside the Executive branch shall be given protection equivalent to that afforded within the Executive branch.

4-2. Special Access Programs.

4-201. Agency heads listed in Section 1-201 may create special access programs to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive information classified pursuant to this Order or prior Orders. Such programs may be created or continued only by written direction and only by those agency heads and, for matters pertaining to intelligence sources and methods, by the Director of Central Intelligence. Classified information in such programs shall be declassified according to the provisions of Section 3.

4-202. Special access programs may be created or continued only on a specific showing that;

(a) normal management and safeguarding procedures are not sufficient to limit need-to-know or access;

(b) the number of persons who will need access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing extra protection for the information involved; and

(c) the special access controls balance the need to protect the information against the full spectrum of needs to use the information.

4-203. All special access programs shall be reviewed regularly and, except those required by treaty or international agreement, shall terminate automatically every five years unless renewed in accordance with the procedures in Section 4-2.

4-204. Within 180 days after the effective date of this Order, agency heads shall review all existing special access programs under their jurisdiction and continue them only in accordance with the procedures in Section 4-2. Each of those agency heads shall also establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall have non-delegable access to all such accountings.

4-3. Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Appointees.

4-301. The requirement in Section 4-101 that access to classified information may be granted only as is necessary for the performance of official duties may be waived as provided in Section 4-302 for persons who:

(a) are engaged in historical research projects,

or

(b) previously have occupied policy-making positions to which they were appointed by the President.

4-302. Waivers under Section 4-301 may be granted only if the agency with jurisdiction over the information:

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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am pleased to sign the Executive Order revamping the government's security classification system.

The public is entitled to know as much as possible about the government's activities. Classification should be used only to protect legitimate national security secrets and never to cover up mistakes or improper activities.

While some material must be classified, the government classifies too much information, classifies it too highly, and for too long. These practices violate the public's right to know, impose unnecessary costs, and weaken protection for truly sensitive information by undermining respect for all classification.

The new Order will increase openness in government by limiting classification and accelerating declassification. At the same time, it will improve protection for information that needs to be kept secret.

The standard for classification has been tightened. No document is to be classified unless its release reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national security. Insignificant damage is not a basis for classification. In addition, the number of agencies and officials with classification authority is being reduced. Delegation of such authority shall be held to a minimum.

All documents should be declassified as early as national security permits. Under the new Order, most documents will be declassified after no more than six years. Only agency heads and officials with Top Secret classification authority may classify for a longer period and only by indicating why classification will remain necessary despite the passage of time. With a few exceptions, the documents given extended classification will be declassified after no more than 20

SALT GR

ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR PRESERVATION PURPOSES

years. The millions of documents classified under prior Orders that are over 20 years old will be reviewed and -- in almost all cases -- released as quickly as possible.

I expect all officials to follow these procedures and the others set out in the new Order. But experience has taught us that strong oversight is needed, both to make the classification system as open as possible and to safeguard properly classified documents. Each agency that handles classified information should take care to ensure that its personnel understand and follow the new procedures.

In addition, I have created an Information Security Oversight Office to provide overall supervision. This Office will have authority to review agencies' procedures and files. It can overrule their regulations and their decisions on classification of individual documents, subject to appeal to the National Security Council. The Office will report regularly to the NSC and to me on compliance with the Order. The Office is a key element to the new classification system, and it will have my strong support.

In a break from precedent, this Order was drafted in consultation with several Congressional Committees and private groups. I particularly wish to thank Senators James Abourezk, Joseph Biden, Edmund Muskie, and Representatives Edward Boland and Richardson Preyer for their valuable assistance.

Jimmy Carter

National Security Information

Order Designating an Official To Classify Information "Top Secret." January 26, 1979

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1-201 of Executive Order 12065 of June 28, 1978, entitled "National Security Information," I hereby designate the Director of the White House Military Office to classify information originally as "Top Secret."

This Order shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

JIMMY CARTER

The White House,
January 26, 1979.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 12:05 p.m., January 26, 1979]

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 26, 1979

THE PRESIDENT. Good afternoon.

Ms. Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND TAIWAN

Q. Mr. President, the United States has acknowledged that there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of it. And, remembering the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as an underpinning of the Vietnam war, my question is, are you concerned that the congressional resolutions regarding Taiwan's security may infringe on China's sovereignty and, two, may involve us at some future point in Asia again?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I'm not concerned about that. I could not approve any legislation presented to me by Con-

gress that would be contradictory or that which would violate the agreements that we have concluded with the Republic of China—the People's Republic of China. I, myself, am committed to a strong and a prosperous and a free people on Taiwan. We intend to carry on our diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China as the Government of China, but we'll have trade relationships, cultural relationships with the people on Taiwan. And I believe that the legislation that has now been presented to the Congress is a good foundation for this.

But I don't see this as an opening for bloodshed or war. I think the statements made by the Chinese leaders since the announcement of intentions to establish diplomatic relations have been very constructive and have indicated a peaceful intent.

Q. Are you speaking also of the Kennedy resolution, which will be introduced on Monday, or only your own resolution?

THE PRESIDENT. I haven't read the so-called Kennedy resolution. I really don't believe that any resolution is needed. I think our legislative proposal and the announcement made about normalization, the combination of those two is adequate.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

Q. Mr. President, on Tuesday you said that we would have a SALT agreement if the Soviet Union continued to negotiate in good faith.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Q. Do you have any slight doubt in your mind on that score?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I've been in office now 2 years, and we've been negotiating with the Soviets almost full-time on a SALT agreement. Prior to that

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June 9

Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1978

Father's Day, 1978

Proclamation 4574. June 9, 1978

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Today's fathers face new challenges as America changes. In addition to their traditional role as breadwinner for the family, many fathers are playing a greater role in raising children and in the home. The preservation of America's family structure will, in large measure, depend upon their ability to meet these demands.

To honor our Nation's fathers, and to provide an opportunity to reflect upon their contributions to our society, the Congress, by joint resolution of April 24, 1972 (86 Stat. 124; 36 U.S.C. 142a), has asked the President to issue annually a proclamation calling upon the American people to observe the third Sunday in June of each year as Father's Day.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby request that Sunday, June 18, 1978, be observed as Father's Day. I direct Government officials to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings on that day and I urge all citizens to display the flag at their homes and other suitable places.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ninth day of June, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and second.

JIMMY CARTER

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 2:53 p.m., June 9, 1978]

Government in the Sunshine Act

Memorandum From the President. June 9, 1978

Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies

Subject: "The Government in the Sunshine" Act: Implementation

The Government in the Sunshine Act requires certain Executive agencies to give notice of their business meetings and open them to public observation unless they must be closed for any of ten specific reasons. If the agency finds that the public interest requires, it must open its meeting to public observation even if there is a reason to close it. The same reasons which permit Executive agencies to close their meetings also permit advisory committees to close theirs.

To evaluate compliance with this Act, I have asked the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to record the number of meetings subject to the Act, to note whether those meetings are open or closed, and if closed, to state the reason for closing them. He will pass this information along to me and to the Congress, recommending whatever actions may be appropriate to meet the spirit as well as the letter of the law.

In litigation under the Act, the Attorney General and the affected agencies must not defend the closing of any meeting unless they can demonstrate that harm would have resulted if an open meeting had been held.

I urge the agencies covered by the Sunshine Act to respect it by opening to the public as many meetings as possible.

JIMMY CARTER

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Our country's ideals and concerns and sent in the minds of the most deprived, who've suffered from discrimination, and I have realized who

her best regards. And you can look on the stage and see why I was not concerned to know that she would be gone. [Laughter]

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6:07 p.m. in the East Room at the White House.

Situation in Iraq and Iran

White House Statement.
September 26, 1980

Over the past several days, as the President noted in his statement of September 24, the President and the Secretary of State have exchanged views with key friends and allies on a wide range of issues related to the conflict between Iran and Iraq. We have consulted with a number of friendly nations about the status of oil supplies and international shipping in the Persian Gulf area. In view of the importance of minimizing the economic effects of the conflict on international shipping and world petroleum markets, the United States has indicated that it would be willing to host a meeting to review these issues if that should seem desirable. If it is determined that a meeting of experts is required, we will work out timing and location. No such meeting has been set. In the meantime, our consultations are continuing.

Libraries and Information Services

Message to the Congress.
September 26, 1980

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit to you the Report of the White House Conference on

Libraries and Information Services and my own recommendations on public access to information, as required by Section 1(d) of Public Law 93-568 of December 31, 1974.

Information is the essence of education and the lifeblood of democracy. People need accurate information to make the personal and political decisions that will shape the country's future. The production and distribution of information is a significant factor in our economy. A technological explosion is reshaping the way information is stored and communicated, while rising costs and limited resources strain the public institutions that make information accessible.

The White House Conference considered all these issues. It examined our information needs and problems and the key role of libraries in meeting them. The delegates included librarians, information specialists and community leaders. They were selected at conferences in every state and territory, through a process that involved 100,000 people. I wish to commend the National Conference on Libraries and Information Services for their key role in making the Conference a success. The Conference theme was "Bringing Information to the People." Its recommendations will help us frame an information policy for the 1980's.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LIBRARIES

Since the beginning of our Nation, libraries have played an important role in providing citizens with the information they need to guide our destiny. Our First Amendment rights have been strengthened by the independent status of libraries free from government control. By preserving the records of our history and culture, libraries serve as a door into our past. As a source of the information we

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libraries; research and development in information technologies; and research libraries.

The Conference recommended a new National Library and Information Services Act to redefine the Federal role. I will submit new legislation to replace the Library Services and Construction Act which will expire in 1982. This legislation will include such issues as:

- barriers to information access for the handicapped and disadvantaged;
- library networking and resource sharing;
- the role of large urban libraries and research libraries as centers for library resource networks; and
- new information technologies.

I urge the Congress, the library community, and the public to join in the discussion during the next year on the priorities among these important concerns.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

The Federal Government has a special responsibility to ensure that its information is made available to the people. Open government is vital to democracy. We must also recognize the constraints of national security, privacy, efficient decision making, and costs.

We are working to address these concerns in a way that increases access to information. A new office has been established in the Office of Management and Budget to develop Federal information policy. This office is working closely with the agencies, libraries, and private sector to develop a policy on the management and dissemination of information by Federal agencies. This policy will affirm the key role of the Federal depository libraries as centers where citizens can obtain free access to government publications.

The policy will also stress the special

role libraries can play in helping Federal agencies disseminate information that people need. We should not create new delivery systems when libraries, with strong community bases, can do the job. The Denver Public Library is one example of a library that is working closely with several agencies to make consumer and environmental information available. I encourage and support cooperation like this. To foster such partnership, I have directed the Administrator of the General Services Administration to work with the library community and the Department of Education to select three to five Federal Information Centers and locate them together with libraries. If this cooperative effort is as successful as I expect, I will expand the program.

My Administration has also taken a number of other initiatives to improve and enhance public access to government information. For example:

- We revamped the security classification system to eliminate needless initial classification and reduce the time that documents remain classified while strengthening protection for necessary secrets. About 250 million pages of documents will be released because of this change.

- The Freedom of Information Act is being administered fairly. The Department of Justice has instructed agencies to release information that could legally be withheld if the release could not be clearly harmful.

- Our policy on industrial innovation calls for an improvement in the dissemination of patent information, which will make over 4 million patents accessible.

- The National Technical Information Service has expanded the indexing and dissemination systems available to scientists and engineers.

- Increases were requested for the Na-

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I would like to know, can you—or what will you do to get at least the Department to show some semblance of sensitivity toward this program?

THE PRESIDENT. I looked at them too when I came in. There are not many women behind me and there are not many minority groups. When I've gone to other departments, there have been a much greater percentage. We've tried hard to do this, and I think we are making some good progress. In the number of women, for instance, who occupy the top five grade levels, the executive levels of our Government, we will have, I would say, four or five times as many as any administration has in the past. In the number of black citizens who serve in those top positions, we will have four or five times as many as we've had in the past—three times as many; in Spanish-speaking Americans, three or four times as many. But that's a relatively small total number, although the percentage is great.

I think that the appointment of top-level position employees who are in minority groups or who are women will help in the long run to change that around.

In the Commerce Department, 50 percent of the top-level positions are now filled by women, for instance; several of them black. I think Griffin Bell has done a superb job in the Attorney General's office by bringing in top-level minority groups and women. It's a slow thing.

We now have a handicap in the lower levels of employment over which we presently have very little control as you know, because we have such a confused responsibility within the Federal Government for guaranteeing equal employment opportunities. I think we have seven different Federal agencies responsible for equal employment. We have a backlog of 130,000 cases. The average time from the initiation of a complaint to the resolution

of a case is about 3 years. And by that time, obviously the aggrieved party and the witnesses, and so forth, have moved or have dropped the case or it's become very expensive for them.

I hope to bring some order out of that chaos. I am waiting until I get authority from the Congress to reorganize to bring that into being. But my own commitment is totally to the resolution of this problem.

And I think, to be perfectly frank, that the State Department is probably the Department that needs progress more than any other. And I am determined that this will be done. It has historically been the case. And I think that Secretary Vance has made a great deal of progress already. But he and I will work together to bring a better answer to your question the next time I come over here in the future.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Q. I am concerned about the policy of openness in regard to intelligence activities. And I was wondering if it doesn't make it more difficult for our friends to confide in us and for those who are not our friends to take advantage of us?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't guess you had time to watch the press conference yesterday, which was during the working hours. I didn't get a chance to see it myself. I was shocked when I took office to learn about the number of different people who have access to highly secret, sensitive information on which the security of our Nation depends. There are about 75 people on Capitol Hill who have access to this very sensitive material. There are too many in the executive branch of Government. At the same time, I know that there is a need for checks and balances to be sure that we don't repeat the illegalities and improprieties that were revealed with the CIA and

other intelligence in the past.

I am concerned about the analysis of intelligence community. Admittedly, it will be the new commitment. But with Admiral Brown and Admiral Skelton, with the Admiral Harold Brown, to evolve a new intelligence community within the limit of divestiture to be, and to guarantee to the abuses that have been perpetrated.

In the last few years, I had a chance to talk to our leaders. I had not been realizing that we can have a committee which would be composed of whom we can trust its entirety to intelligence. I think a key group, myself, the which is an anyone can let that be.

We are not of our key coming relationship with their being.

Now, I am yesterday the revelations I written two apologizing CIA files to reports were had some d

I have not seen the evidence between

other intelligence community agencies in the past.

I am conducting now a very careful analysis of the entire intelligence community. Admiral Stan Turner is going to be the new Director. He shares my commitment. But working with Cyrus Vance, with Admiral Turner, with Dr. Brzezinski, with the Attorney General, and with Harold Brown and myself, we are trying to evolve very rapidly what the intelligence community ought to be, what the limit of divulging of this material ought to be, and how can we at the same time guarantee to the American people that the abuses will be permanently eliminated.

In the last 2 or 3 days, I've had a chance to meet with the congressional leaders. I have hopes, which may or may not be realized—it's not in my control—that we can have one joint congressional committee with a limited membership to whom we can reveal what is going on in its entirety within the confines of the intelligence community. So, we will have a key group of Congress—very small—myself, the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is an independent agency to whom anyone can come and give complaints or revelations, the Attorney General, and let that be it.

We are not in the position where some of our key intelligence sources are becoming reluctant to continue their relationship with us because of the danger of their being exposed in the future.

Now, I also pointed out to the press yesterday that many of the recent public revelations have been erroneous. I have written two letters to foreign leaders apologizing for them after I checked the CIA files to find that the published reports were completely in error. Others had some degree of accuracy within them.

I have reviewed all of the correspondence between the Intelligence Oversight

Board and President Ford last year. The Attorney General was involved. I have not detected any instance of an impropriety or an illegality that is presently being conducted or that was conducted in the last 6 or 8 months, as far back as my study went.

And I think it's good for the American people to know this. But we have got to have a good intelligence system in order to protect the security of our country. We sometimes relax too much in peacetime. We've got to establish this relationship on a permanent, workable basis while we are at peace. It's one of the best means to make sure we don't have war. And if we should ever be in danger in a time of crisis, it's too late to build up an adequate intelligence community, including our worldwide system of information.

So, your question is a very good one. And this is a matter that presses on me in a very personal way. And I think I can tell you that within the next couple of months your questions will be answered satisfactorily. I've had good response from the Members of Congress. There are now six committees in the House that have access to this information by law. The Speaker has indicated yesterday to the Vice President that he would favor one joint committee. Whether that will be feasible, I don't know, but that's our hope in the Congress.

And I will do the same thing in the executive branch of Government to make sure we do have adequate oversight, but also at the same time an adequate degree of privacy and secrecy in things that ought not to be revealed.

Maybe one more question.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

Q. I would like to know how can AID, with all the reorganization that is going on in the Federal Government, with the low-

ering of Government spending, how can AID be allowed to spend a quarter of a million dollars to move a portion of its agency into buildings when the overall object of AID is to get the people into two buildings rather than have them scattered all over the Washington area?

THE PRESIDENT. That's a question that I can't answer. [Laughter]

The question was that when we are short of money for the AID program, how can we, as was expressed, waste a quarter of a million dollars moving AID personnel to a building when the purpose ought to be to bring the AID people together.

I don't know the background of the question. I don't know the answer. But if you would permit Secretary Vance to give you an answer to your question later on, I will pass that question on to him.

Since I couldn't answer that question, I will try another one. I hate to end up on a question I can't answer. [Laughter].

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

Q. Mr. President, I would like to know if you are aware of the increased amount of requests for freedom of information material that is going to be released or will be released which I think in the future might come back to haunt us?

THE PRESIDENT. I am familiar with the problem. In general, I favor the freedom of information laws. I think that one thing that we might do within the bounds of the law, which I doubt could be repealed even if we wanted it to be, is to restore the trust of the American people in us.

When there is a sense among American citizens that they are being misled or that illegalities are taking place within our own Government, like the plotting of assassinations or murders and so forth, or when they feel that their own rights are not being protected by their own Government, I think under those circumstances

that there is an excessive pressure on Government for information. If that same citizen had a sense that he could trust us, there would be much less inclination to demand access to the files.

I am not sure that I've answered your question adequately but that's one approach to it.

And I think I might, as President, assume more responsibility in that field. When I learn more about it, when I have a little more time in office, when the people have a more accurate sense of what I am and what I stand for, I might very well point out to the American people in a press conference or otherwise that this has become a problem for us, and just as a matter of idle curiosity or just to test the law, for them to refrain from asking for this information. If they genuinely need it, we will provide it. But I think that the first few months of a new law like that, there is an inclination on the part of those who have fought for it just to test it, to see if they ask for something, can they really get it.

So, I hope that with those two or three approaches that we might take within the bounds of the law that we can minimize the burden on us in months to come. I hope so.

Let me say this in closing: I think we've made good progress in the first month in learning about one another and in my learning about the Federal Government, in seeing the extent and the limitation of my own influence in the White House, in learning about foreign countries and their inclinations toward us, the problem areas that we can address and those that we ought to avoid addressing for a while. I think that we've got a good sense around the world of what we are trying to do already.

I can't think of any time in human history, for instance, when there has been such a worldwide concern about human

rights. An on freedom on totalit ing some are our p and what about us?

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I want want to se be disapp lationship officials in on which

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Meeting Kurt-W United N

Remarks of Secretary G.

THE PRES that I am

rights. And both nations that are founded on freedom and those that are founded on totalitarian governments are now doing some reassessments and saying, what are our policies toward our own citizens and what does the rest of the world think about us?

So, even in these early, few days, we are making some progress. I've got to be careful not to make a serious mistake. At the same time, I've got to be careful not to be too timid, and when I make a judgment, that it's a proper one. And that's where you come in, because collectively, you have a sense of what the world is and what the world might be.

I want to be a good President. And I want to serve in such a way that you won't be disappointed in me. But my good relationship with you and the other senior officials in this Department are the basis on which I might succeed.

So, we are partners, and I believe together we can give the American people an accurate sense that they have a good government in what is and always has been the greatest nation on Earth.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 2:37 p.m. in the Dean Acheson Auditorium at the Department of State, after having toured the Department's Communications Center. While at the Communications Center, the President typed a message on a teletype machine linked to the United States Embassy in Paris, in which he greeted all State Department employees stationed overseas.

Meeting With Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations

Remarks of the President and the Secretary General. February 25, 1977

THE PRESIDENT. I would like to say that I am very deeply grateful that Sec-

retary General Waldheim and his wife Elizabeth and his beautiful daughter Christa have come to be with us at noon today.

This is not an official meeting but is one of great importance. It is going to be a working luncheon.

We have been greatly impressed at the ability of the Secretary General in his travels around the world to the trouble spots that concern us all to search out common ground on which future peaceful agreements might be reached. His recent reelection as the first leader of the world is an indication of his stature among all those who participate in the United Nations deliberations.

This is a year, I believe, when he and I will be drawn much closer together than perhaps has been often the case in the past. And I think it is accurate to say that my appointment of Ambassador Andrew Young to the United Nations and the close relationship that Ambassador Young and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and I have with each other will provide a common base on which we can demonstrate to other nations of the world our deep commitment to the United Nations and what it stands for—peace in the world and a commitment to human rights, which has been the characteristic of Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in his long experience and service as one of the world's foremost diplomats.

So, we welcome you here, and your family, Kurt Waldheim. And I look forward to a long and continuing and, hopefully, mutually successful effort between our country and the United Nations to bring about peace in the world and to protect human rights and to meet those needs that are so vivid in our world today.

Welcome to the White House.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL. *Mr. President, Mrs. Carter:*

help in the training, development, and upgrading of such businesses.

(b) Eligible small businesses are those located in areas of high concentration of unemployed or low-income individuals, businesses owned by low-income individuals, and those businesses eligible for assistance under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a), 92 Stat. 1761).

1-202. The Committee shall make periodic reports and recommendations to the President through the Administrator of the Small Business Administration and shall offer such other advice and at such times as the President through the Administrator may request.

1-203. The Committee, through its Chairman, shall report annually to the President and to the Congress on the activities of the Committee during the preceding calendar year.

1-3. *Administrative Provisions.*

1-301. The Committee may request any Executive agency to furnish such information as may be useful in fulfilling the Committee's functions. Each such agency is authorized, to the extent permitted by law, to furnish such information to the Committee.

1-302. Each member of the Committee who is not otherwise employed by the Federal Government shall receive no compensation from the United States by virtue of their service on the Committee, but all members may receive transportation and travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 5702 and 5703.

1-303. All necessary administrative staff services, support, facilities, and expenses of the Committee shall, to the extent permitted by law, be furnished by the Small Business Administration.

1-4. *General Provisions.*

1-401. The functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), except that of reporting annually to the Congress, which are applicable to the Committee, shall be performed by the Administrator of the Small Business Administration in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

1-402. The Committee shall terminate on December 31, 1980.

JIMMY CARTER

The White House,
February 1, 1980.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register,
2:33 p.m., February 1, 1980]

President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties

Appointment of 29 Members.
February 1, 1980

The President today announced the appointment of 29 persons as members of the President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties. They are:

ROBERT S. BENSON, author of "Counter-budget," national priorities expert;
CHARLES BISHOP, president, University of Arkansas;
GWENDOLYN BROOKS, poet;
J. FRED BUGY, JR., president, Texas Instruments;
JOAN GANZ COONEY, Children's Television Workshop;
DANIEL EVANS, president, Evergreen College;
FRANCES FITZGERALD, author;
HERMAN GALLEGOS, chairman, Human Resources Corp.;
DONALD GEVIRTZ, financier, Los Angeles, Calif.;
C. JACKSON GRAYSON, director, American Productivity Center;
WILLIAM HEWITT, chairman, John Deere Co.;

Feb. 1

Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1980

- BENJAMIN HOOKS, chairman, NAACP;
- THOMAS JORLING, professor of environmental science, Williams College;
- RHODA KARPATKIN, president, Consumers Union;
- THEODORE MARMOR, Yale Institute for Social Policy Studies;
- MARTIN MARTY, University of Chicago Divinity School;
- WILLIAM MILLER, partner, Steptoe & Johnson;
- ALAN MORRISON, director, Public Citizen Litigation Group;
- ROGER NOLL, professor of economics, California Institute of Technology;
- EDMUND PELLEGRINO, president, Catholic University;
- TOMAS RIVERA, chancellor, University of California (Riverside);
- PAUL ROGERS, former U.S. Representative (D-Fla.);
- CARL SAGAN, astronomer, Cornell University;
- HOWARD SAMUELS, Howard Samuels Enterprises;
- BEVERLY SILLS, director, New York City Opera;
- LEWIS THOMAS, chairman, Sloan-Kettering Institute;
- FOY VALENTINE, executive director, Christian Life Committee, Southern Baptist Convention;
- MARINA V.N. WHITMAN, vice president, General Motors Corp.;
- ADDIE WYATT, international vice president, Packinghouse Workers.

The Commission will have a staff of about 25 people. They will be jointly directed by Richard A. Wegman, staff director, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and Claude Barfield, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Demonstration, Department of Housing and Urban Development.

National Council on the Humanities

Nomination of Marian B. Javits To Be a Member. February 1, 1980

The President today announced that he will nominate Marian B. Javits, of New

York City, to be a member of the National Council on the Humanities for a term expiring January 26, 1982.

Javits is a consultant on the arts who designs business and production environments. She is a member of the Visual Arts Panel of the National Endowment for the Arts and is president of a company that offers limited print editions of the works of leading American painters. She worked actively for creation of the National Foundation for the Arts along with her husband, then-Representative Jacob K. Javits.

United States-Switzerland Agreement on Social Security

Message to the Congress Transmitting the Agreement. February 1, 1980

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to section 233(e) (1) of the Social Security Act as amended by the Social Security Amendments of 1977 (P.L. 95-216, 42 U.S.C. 1305 note), I transmit herewith the Agreement between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Social Security, signed on July 18, 1979, the Final Protocol to the 1979 Agreement, also signed on July 18, 1979, and the Administrative Agreement for the Implementation of the 1979 Agreement, signed on December 20, 1979.

These U.S.-Swiss agreements are similar in objective to the U.S.-Italian social security agreements that I transmitted to the Congress on February 28, 1978, and to the U.S.-West Germany social security agreements that I transmitted to Congress on February 28, 1979. These bilateral agreements, which are generally known as totalization agreements, provide for limited coordination between the United States and foreign social security systems

to overcome the in protection an taxation.

I also transm the Congress a c pared by the De cation and Wel provisions of tl vides data on affected by the effect on social quired by the sa Security Amend

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The White Hou February 1, 1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#79003

ACTION

January 24, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 
SUBJECT: Original Classification Authority
for White House Military Office

Because of its responsibility for the White House Emergency Plan and other contingency planning matters, the White House Military Office originates a large number of classified documents. At present, however, the Military Office does not possess any original classification authority, since it was not included among those White House offices you designated in your June 28, 1978 Order accompanying the new classification Executive Order.

Based on a review of the Military Office's classification requirements -- including the number of classified documents originated and the sensitivity of these documents -- I believe that the Director of the White House Military Office has a legitimate need for original "Top Secret" classification authority. I recommend, therefore, that you designate the Director to classify information originally as "Top Secret." Bob Lipshutz, Stu Eizenstat, and Jim McIntyre concur in this recommendation.

At Tab A is a proposed Order designating the Director of the White House Military Office to classify information originally as "Top Secret." The proposed Order does not permit any delegation of this authority by the Director, so there should be no increase in the number of classified documents as a result of your designation Order.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the designation Order at Tab A.

White House Tries to Plug Leaks of Classified Material

By JACK ANDERSON

SOMETIMES it seems as if Richard Nixon never left town. A few weeks ago, President Carter fumed at his Cabinet about the "leaks of Cabinet minutes." He made it perfectly clear that he didn't like to read his confidential conversations in our column. He sounded just like Nixon.

Now the State Department is in an uproar over our publication of a confidential cable from Ambassador Ronald Spiers in Turkey. No one has yet formed a "plumbers squad" to shut off the leaks. But Carter has ordered his Cabinet Secretary, Jack Watson, to find who's responsible for the leaks and to submit "a memorandum on this subject." And State has its security apparatus on the lookout for our source. It seems like old times.

We upset the pontificators at Foggy Bottom by reporting Spier's assessment of a recent speech by Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. It was a chauvinistic speech, and Spiers called it "mindless nationalism" in a cable to the State Department.

We cited the cable in a report on the popular international sport of flogging the United States. Indeed, the cable expressed concern that Ecevit "may so enjoy the popular acclaim that comes from talking back to Americans that he will continue it."

We felt the American people were entitled to know that our allies, Greeks and Turks alike, enjoyed assailing America. But our story caused a furor; we have reli-

ably learned that Ecevit, his sensibilities offended, raised an unholy howl.

The State Department ordered Spiers to fly to Brussels to soothe the ruffled Ecevit, who was in Belgium at the time. According to confidential sources, the ambassador told Ecevit that we had taken the embarrassing quote out of context.

IN WASHINGTON, Turkish Ambassador Melih Esenbel filed a formal protest with the State Department. He, too, was assured that we had misrepresented the meaning of Spiers' comments.

It has been our practice, when we are accused of taking quotes out of context, to supply the context. The controversial cable, dated March 24, 1978, began:

"Prime Minister Ecevit's foreign policy-speech to the Senate March 23 covered the same material as the speech before the National Assembly the previous day, but the tone was harsher and more nationalistic and perhaps for that reason, the Turkish press gave the Senate speech better coverage.

"In his speech, Ecevit clearly identified the United States as the source of outside pressures that the Turkish nation would unite to withstand. He also repeated his claim that Turkey has given more to NATO than it has received, and he again spoke of the need of Turkey to develop a new security concept."

THE CABLE then reviewed the Prime Minister's speech, singling out several direct quotes. Finally, the cable concluded:

"It is not clear why Ecevit decid-

ed to resort to emotional nationalism to defend his foreign-policy performance. At this point he appears to have sufficiently strong public and political support that he does not need the assistance of mindless nationalism.

"One possible reason is his continuing deep unhappiness with what he considered to be an attempt by the U.S. to pressure him and thus threaten the success of Montreux (a Greek-Turkish summit meeting held in March).

"Another possibility is that he is preparing the public for a radical departure from traditional Turkish foreign policy. We tend to believe it is the former, but the danger is that he may so enjoy the popular acclaim that comes from talking back to Americans that he will continue it even after the current misunderstanding has passed."

The State Department, in the Nixon tradition, is now trying to discover the source of our news.

The State Department is also investigating the leak of classified information to Greece. But in at least one instance, the document was forged. The most prominent opposition leader in Athens, leftist Andreas Papandreou, stood on the floor of Parliament and read directly from what purported to be a secret State Department cable.

A computer search of the files, sources told us, proved that the document was a fake. Now State Department gumshoes are considering the possibility that Soviet KGB agents concocted the cable that was slipped to Papandreou.

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MIAMI HERALD 6/8/78 Pg 2A



Jody

You may want to write
a letter of thanks to Clayton
Kilpatrick, Editor of the Chi. Trib.

WW

On government's right to lie

Chi. TRIB. 4/10

What does a White House press secretary say when asked at a meeting of journalists whether the government has a right to lie? There is no easy answer, as a succession of government PR men have learned to their sorrow, and the candid reply given by Jody Powell at a meeting of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, is about as sensible as any.

"I don't know," he said. "I think that as a general rule the answer is no. But I can't say that I could not posit a hypothetical situation in which it would be a very close call at the very least. . . . The question is whether my integrity is more important than whatever else is at stake. My integrity or someone else's life? What are you going to do?"

It's hard to quarrel with that. The answer is easy when the issue is one of good versus evil. No fair-minded person will tolerate lies to conceal something like Watergate. Martyrdom is achieved by defending goodness against the greater power of evil, not against a greater good.

The moral issue arises only when it is a matter of one right versus another right, and the question then is which right should prevail. A succession of Defense Department and White House spokesmen during the Kennedy, Johnson, and early Nixon years defended the government's right to lie (though they preferred to word it more diplomatically) about American prospects in the Viet

Nam war. They were willing to subordinate their integrity to the government's desire to retain public support for the war. They were widely—and as things turned out properly—denounced in the press. The effect of their "news management" was to prolong at great expense a war which, in retrospect, we could not win. Had the Viet Nam venture succeeded, of course, history's verdict would be very different; they might even have seemed heroes.

There are instances in which moral judgment must come down on the side of the liars—as when Dutch or Belgian officials lied to protect Jews and other potential victims from the advancing Nazi troops. Or when an official lies in order to dissuade a terrorist from murder.

In short, this is an imperfect world and we can't always rely on absolute answers. When two rights collide, as they often do in matters of law, people in authority have to "make the best decisions they can," in Mr. Powell's words, and trust that history will vindicate them.

Mr. Powell's answer should enhance his credibility rather than jeopardize it. And the surest way to avoid being thrust into the position he dreads is to maintain the open administration to which Mr. Carter seems committed. The fewer secrets there are, the less chance there is that the truth and the national interest will collide.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1978

Dear George:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of May 17 concerning your views and those expressed by Howard Kurtz on the relationship of space technologies to maintaining peace.

Mr. Kurtz's views are well-known. I read with interest the literature that he sends. He has also provided key members of my staff with a briefing of his views. We are sensitive to his ideas and we keep them in mind.

As you know, we have briefed key members of Congress interested in space policy matters on the contents of PRM-23. Those wishing to read the actual contents of the Presidential Decision Memorandum were shown the text. We have had favorable comments from a number of Congressmen and Senator Stevenson and Representative Fuqua personally expressed their satisfaction to the President with the decisions taken.

The President is committed to the peaceful uses of space and has said so on a number of occasions. Whenever a foreign head of state visits him, the President presents a book of Landsat photographs, offering to provide access to American space technology for peaceful uses, particularly on behalf of developing countries.

The President has initiated discussions with the Soviets for Arms Control measures that would prevent space warfare. The discussions will begin early next month.

PRM-23 and the Presidential Decision which evolved from it commits this country to a strong civil space program for our own benefit and for the benefit of all countries in the world. We have offered access to the shuttle to all countries for use in launching satellites that would benefit all people.

Mr. Kurtz's views are laudible ones and represent goals that we should all work toward. Unfortunately, we cannot unilaterally achieve them without cooperation of the other great powers.

Yours sincerely,



Frank Press
Science and Technology
Adviser to the President

cc: Congressional Liaison ✓

Honorable George E. ^XBrown, Jr.
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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DG

(2)

May 26, 1978

EXECUTIVE

OB

PC

Kurtz Howard G.

Dear Congressman Brown:

The President has asked me to acknowledge his receipt of your letter of May 17 regarding the relationship of space technologies to maintaining peace.

The President appreciates your comments, and has them under consideration. You should receive a further response shortly.

Sincerely,

Frank Moore
Assistant to the President
for Congressional Liaison

X

The Honorable George E. Brown, Jr.
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

incoming has gone to Frank Press,
FOR RESPONSE

5-19/SU05

6

RECEIVED
CENTRAL FILE

GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.
2342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
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(202) 225-6161

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(3638 UNIVERSITY AVENUE)
(714) 686-8863

May 17, 1978

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

ACK. FM/Press
CONGRESSIONAL
LITIGATION

MAY 19 1978

Dear Mr. President:


The enclosed material from Howard G. Kurtz deals with a subject that is of great interest to me. If I wished, I could send a great deal more material which represents both my own concerns, and those expressed by Howard Kurtz. The issue is peace (or war, if one prefers), and the relationship, of space technologies to maintaining peace.

Because of my interest in this subject, I recently received a briefing from representatives of your staff on PRM 23. I must say that that briefing raised more questions in my mind than it answered. I have discussed my concerns with other members of the Science and Technology Committee, and expect to see this Committee take a more active interest in all aspects of space policy in the near future.

My purpose for sending you these enclosures from Howard Kurtz is to solicit a rebuttal, or clarification of the charges made by Mr. Kurtz. I must say that I am sometimes inclined to agree with his pessimistic analysis and my request for your response is meant to give me time to further reflect upon this subject, and avoid unfair criticism of your Administration's policy.

Therefore, I would appreciate receiving, at the earliest possible date, a response to the enclosures.

Sincerely,



George E. Brown, Jr.
Member of Congress

Enclosures
GEB:tl:k

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5001



WAR CONTROL PLANNERS, INC.

Box 19127, Washington, D.C. 20036

202/785-0708

May 13, 1978

personal and informal

HONORABLE GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.
=====

In an effort to break the paralysis which grips the President, I submitted the enclosed to the Washington Post OP-ED page editor. As might have been predicted they rejected it. There are no restrictions on its use.

For your personal information I have sent a copy to Charles A. Mosher, Staff Director who is very familiar with Harriet's and my work. Whether or not he shows it to Chairman Teague I can not estimate. If you care to speak with Mr. Mosher personally, please feel free to do so.

By a sort of cosmic coincidence, Mr. Mosher has advised me that the enclosed (1) Policy Perspectives document and (2) Dr. Robert A. Frosch's supportive letter will be published in the public Record of the May 16-17-18 hearings on International Space programs. But by the time this comes back from the Government Printing Office in several months, it may be too late!

Eleanor Roosevelt cautioned Harriet that when science and technology reached the point where our projections were feasible, we would have a struggle to reach the mind of the President over the heads of his closest national security advisors, as the concept of the Manhattan Project had to reach the mind of President Roosevelt over the heads of his closest national security advisors.

The financial/industrial/military interests which surround and isolate the President and finding their own personal rewards from the escalating race for the power to obliterate world civilization, have been, and remain, intensely hostile to our strategic studies. It may be that the Congress is the one place where the creative public discussion can be launched.

with deep appreciation for your efforts

HOWARD GY. KURTZ



National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Washington, D.C.
20546

Office of the Administrator

FEB 8 1978

Honorable Olin E. Teague
Chairman
Committee on Science and Technology
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515


Dear Tiger:

In your letter of January 27 you asked for my personal views on two questions stemming from Howard Kurtz' theme of a global information cooperative. While I may differ with Kurtz on certain specifics, there is no question but that he is on the right track. The technologies available today for gathering worldwide information and for its redistribution are certainly well enough advanced to warrant consideration of an operational global environmental and resources system. In its earliest configuration, such a national system for world use need not, in my opinion, have a major budgetary impact. The real tasks are: 1) organizing the multiplicity of data and information sources (both terrestrial and spatial); 2) assuring that these multiple data streams are available to interpreters and users in useful form and on the required schedule; and 3) establishing and maintaining the continuity of these services. We have recently begun a conceptual design effort on such an approach to help us understand its real scope and value.

I believe that the mood of the country and world would be receptive to a dramatic political and practical initiative along these lines, and that the long-range implications for civilization in the large can only be positive. I hope to interest the Administration in such a policy proposal in the near future.

I would be delighted to discuss this matter with you further at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



Robert A. Frosch

WAR CONTROL PLANNERS, Inc.
Box 19127, Washington D.C. 20036
Telephone (202) 785 - 0708

For Hon. George E. Brown Jr

5/2-75
Revised by
Philip Geyelin
Editor Page Editor

May 9, 1978

THE WASHINGTON POST OP-ED PAGE EDITOR

THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY Howard G. Kurtz
(co-founder with the late Rev. Harriet B. Kurtz of the global
strategic discussion center - War Control Planners, Inc.)

Behind walls of secrecy in the White House in recent days the final draft of Presidential Review Memorandum # 23 was passed to President Carter for secret signature, to provide a "Space Policy". Neither Congress, the press nor the public has been permitted to know the content of PRM 23.

All indications are that a new Age of Space War competition is beginning. If so this will be a Dark Age of Hopelessness for mankind. More scarce energies & resources will be diverted away from the needs of humanity. World-wide fires of inflation will be fanned. Taxation will increase. A fog of anxiety and dread gradually will gover the Earth. Hope for a worthwhile future will wither and die.

But behind the walls of secrecy in the White House the situation is even worse. The President has become surrounded and isolated by national security, foreign policy and military advisors acting out the basic assumptions they learned in the 1950s:- balancing U.S. escalating power to destroy world civilization against escalating Soviet power to destroy world civilization . . a strategy of ultimate despair.

But in the privacy of his meditations or prayers the President's predicament is even more desperate. Obsolete advisors have led him into a fatal strategic trap. Although this deadly trap extends across the full spectrum of strategic power decisions, it can be seen clearly as the President finds PRM23 on his desk. On the one hand if the President gives in to the "hardline" advisors and further escalates the Kremlin/ White House Space War competition, as we have suggested this will gradually darken

Nations) capable of guarding the national security and progress of all 150 or more sovereign nations, as Air Traffic Control guards the safety and progress of all airplanes in a cloud.

As President Roosevelt found the unprecedented power to (1) prosecute World War II and in addition (2) unleash the creativity and power of America in the Manhattan Project . . . today President Carter and Congress have far greater unprecedented power to (1) meet all requirements for national defense in the coming era and in addition (2) unleash the creativity and power and character of America for a next generation "race" to develop the global systems and institutions and structures capable of protecting the Soviet people from ever again ~~being~~ being threatened by foreign enemies, protecting the Chinese people from ever again being threatened by foreign enemies, protecting the people of all 150 or more sovereign nations, including the United States, from ever again being threatened by foreign enemies . . . thereby releasing the scarce energies and resources of the Earth for the production of food, clothing, housing, energy, clean air & water, health, education and national security for the people of all nations.

Like a successful football coach Republican or Democratic American President for the coming generation will have to be in command of two different kinds of strategic power. They will have to maintain a superior defense team to keep opposing powers from breaking through to their goal of world dominion. And in addition . . . they will have to create and maintain a superior forward team to lead the nations of the world in the competition to develop and demonstrate the LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR PLANET EARTH . . . to make the Earth safe for human futures everywhere as in the past generations we led the world in making the Moon safe for human visits.

Instead of fighting each other as the "doves" and the "hawks" have been doing, Americans on the superior defense teams and Americans on the superior forward teams will be struggling toward the great distant goal of a civilized world order, under the direction of a Coach . . . the President . . . who knows where he is going. The American people are capable of greatness, nobility and commitment of this dimension.

humanity's aspirations for a worthwhile future. But on the other hand if the President gives in to the "softline" advisors and hesitates, or defers decision, or weakens the USS. unilaterally in the face of expanding Kremlin military progress in space, this too will lead toward tragedy and/or chaos for mankind. The President's advisors are lost in runaway world crisis.

A war is not lost on the battlefield. It is lost long in advance in the inadequate or confused concepts in the mind of one human being, the commander-in-chief . . . the Hitler, the Napoleon, the Republican or Democratic President of the United States tormented by his outdated "hardline and "softline" advisors. Breakthrough to a transcendent New American Purpose is imperative and years overdue.

The President of the United States today (and his counterpart in the Kremlin) stand eyeball-to-eyeball in confrontation, wielding the power to destroy mankind . . . a power the ^{MYTH} ~~mythologies~~ mistakenly had claimed that only God could command. In the mythology of most world religions God-sized Power means simultaneously (1) the power to destroy humankind in vengeance in one hand, and in the other hand (2) the compassionate power to protect and enrich life for humanity below.

In the National Security Council & Staff the President has superior command and staff assistance in wielding the God-sized Power to destroy world civilization. But there is no possible way the sinking national security of the U.S. can be regained by unleashing God-sized powers of death, destruction and extermination. Increasingly since the Vietnam War America's growing hostile enemies have realized that the American threat of nuclear war is a bluff . . . that this would be a suicide gesture killing off the American people along with world populations in the holocaust.

But nowhere in the White House is there a supreme strategic council . . . reporting personally to the President and to the American people through their elected Congress . . . separate from and in addition to the essential National Security Council . . . through which the President and Congress can unleash a new generation of American research and development and creativity to pioneer the future world-sized systems and institutions (more complex and effective than the present United

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<u>1/20/77 - 12/31/77</u>	<u>memo</u>	<u>Pres to Tim Kraft</u>		<u>1</u>

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1977

EXECUTIVE

PP17

PP5-1

SC

FG6-1-1/Pres. Annual

FG18

~~PP5-1~~

Questar

TO: Tim Kraft

FROM: Frank Press *FP*

SUBJECT: Planets, Stars and Black Holes

The President would like to set up a lecture on this subject for himself and his family. I suggest an hour in the evening or at the end of the work day.

I will arrange for a distinguished astronomer skilled at giving popular lectures as soon as I have a date from you.

A slide projector, screen and blackboard would be needed.

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CARTER PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS

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